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This policy brief draws on research papers 
and reports from a large-scale longitudinal 
study conducted by Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu 
Das and Asim Ijaz Khwaja through a grant 
from the World Bank’s South Asia Regions 
and Knowledge for Change Trust Funds.
The study, titled “Learning and Educational 
Achievements in Punjab Schools” (LEAPS) 
analyses the education sector in Pakistan, 
its major challenges and policy options for 
moving forward. The data from the study is 
public and is available at 
www.leapsproject.org.
The Reality Of Village Life 
An Educational Marketplace
Multiple Providers, Active Parents
The rise of low-fee private schooling has 
been the most significant development in 
Pakistani education in the last fifteen years, 
with private school growth rates highest in 
rural areas. As of 2005, there were more 
than 50,000 private schools with more than 
a third of total enrollment at the primary 
level. 
In Pakistan’s largest province, Punjab, 
more than 50 percent of the population 
now lives in village with at least one private 
school. Consequently, the rural education 
landscape is now one of multiple schools 
(public and private) in every village. 
Contrary to popular belief, the number of 
Madrassas in Pakistan is low and has shown 
no discernible growth trend.
At the same time, parents across Pakistan 
are active decision-makers in their children’s 
lives, even at low socioeconomic levels and 
in rural areas. They exhibit a high demand 
for education and seek improved schooling 
opportunities for their children. 
Multiple Outcomes 
Price and Quality, Not Just Enrollment
In the past, educational policy has 
principally focused on increases in the 
quantity of education—enrollment. The 
LEAPS studies bring into the forefront two 
other outcomes, price and quality, which 
are  essential to parental decision-making 
as they plan their children’s futures. Price 
and quality are crucial when evaluating 
the current status of schooling and how to 
move forward in terms of school reform.
As in other low-income countries, quality 
in Pakistani schools, as measured by the 
learning levels of children, is low. The 
average child performs well below the 
accepted grade-level standards. However, 
private schools outperform government 
schools significantly, even when located 
in the same village and accounting for 
di!erences in household socioeconomic 
characteristics. Students from private 
schools also have significantly better civic 
attitudes, and they exhibit more trust in 
government and other social institutions, 
and have a lower gender bias.
The presence of private schools has also 
created a range of options at the price-
quality margin. While public schools are free 
for parents, the cost to society of providing 
this education is relatively much higher than 
the private sector, particularly in terms of 
their e"ciency in providing quality. 
Understanding the Educational 
Marketplace
The Supply Side
The Teacher as the Pivotal Figure
The LEAPS set of studies confirm the 
oft-repeated adage: education is not 
about bricks and mortar. As many already 
attest, the central figure in both public and 
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private schools is the teacher. The role 
of the teacher intersects any discussion 
of education reform—be it curricular, 
governance, financial or administrative. The 
divergent cost structures of the two sectors 
as well as the striking contrast in their 
quality levels can also largely be attributed 
to the di!erences in teacher characteristics 
and e!ort.  Whether parents have the 
information to make correct decisions on 
these di!erent margins shall determine 
in large measure the functioning of this 
market.
Private Schools
Teacher Availability
One of the strongest LEAPS findings 
is that the boom in private schooling is 
driven by the availability of low cost, female 
teachers. The data show that private 
schools arise precisely in those villages 
where there exists a pool of educated 
women,  which in turn are far more common 
in areas where there exists a Government 
Girls’ secondary school. Due to a lack of 
outside opportunities, these women have 
lower wage rates than educated men. 
These low wages are then passed onto 
the students in terms of low fees in the 
competitive market. 
 The availability of a!ordable educated 
females—a supply channel—for potentially 
credit-constrained private schools is 
crucial for expansion into poorer regions. 
The availability of better educated and 
knowledgeable teachers is also essential as 
existing private schools upgrade to middle 
and secondary levels as students rise up the 
education ladder.
Public Schools
Teacher Incentives 
 Public school teachers are paid 
better, have more training, and are more 
experienced than their private school 
counterparts. It is therefore particularly 
surprising that public school quality, as 
demonstrated by the learning levels, is so 
low. In addition, parents express frustration 
with their inability to a!ect local school 
governance and the unresponsiveness of 
teachers to parental concerns. All signs 
point to a lack of appropriate incentives 
which leads to low teacher “e!ort.” For 
example, public sector salaries are based 
almost entirely on teacher education, 
training and seniority instead of child 
outcomes, with no adjustment for the 
teacher’s performance - or even whether 
he/she comes to work on a regular basis.
 
The Demand Side
Active Parents, Bounded by Constraints
 Parents have demonstrated a strong pref-
erence for sending their children to schools. 
The LEAPS data also show that parents can 
evaluate their children’s performance and 
that children of even moderately literate 
mothers spend significantly more time 
studying at home. 
Yet, households face serious constraints. 
Lack of income and limited opportunities 
to borrow can lead to low investments in 
children’s learning.  For example, parents 
may not  send their child to the best 
possible school. In the extreme, poverty can 
lead to children dropping out of school, or 
not even enrolling. The evidence suggests 
that rationing of limited resources leads to 
parents “picking winners” at an early age. 
They tend to invest in the child that they 
believe is most likely to succeed.
Recommendations 
Making It Work
The above analysis portrays a dynamic 
situation on the ground in rural Pakistan. 
It is very di!erent from the traditional view 
of rural education characterized by lack 
of demand from poor apathetic parents 
whose only decision is whether to send 
their child to the single Government school 
in the village.  The constraints identified 
above, however, can seriously hamper the 
functioning of this marketplace and its 
growth and development. 
The metaphor of the market does not nec-
essarily imply a hands-o! policy approach 
2 The figure is based on a non-parametric plot of deviations from mean salary against teacher’s English test scores.
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to education in Pakistan, however, nor does 
it imply that this marketplace is e"cient. 
Instead, it suggests that di!erent sides of 
the market are linked and therefore they 
must be analyzed together.  Importantly, 
policy reform targeting any one area will 
have serious repercussions in others. The 
goal of policy in this environment is not 
the creation of a “missing” market from 
the ground up, but to facilitate its function-
ing. This can be achieved by identifying the 
constraints specifically and then alleviat-
ing them—sometimes by direct provision 
of schooling and other times by providing 
information, resources, or changing the 
regulatory environment. And in some cases, 
policy makers can even help by staying out 
of the way and doing nothing. As the new 
reality is not amenable to a one-size-fits-all 
policy solution, experimentation and inno-
vation will necessarily be part and parcel of 
any recommendation. Any policy interven-
tion must, of course, be evaluated in terms 
of the outcomes. 
Recommendations on the Supply Side
Private Schools
Breaking the External Constraints
 The main constraints to private school-
ing are not internal governance but the 
external environment. Policy makers need 
to develop  a new modality for engagement 
with a sector that is large, decentralized and 
composed almost exclusively of indepen-
dent “mom-and-pop” owned schools. Policy 
has to move away from the mind-set of 
engaging with a small group of actors—as 
in dealing with specific NGOs or the public 
sector education departments—and towards 
market-level interventions such as a menu 
of incentives directed towards the sector. 
Teacher Availability
 Low-cost teacher availability remains the 
largest constraint in the expansion of pri-
vate schools to other villages. According to 
the LEAPS report, private schools are “three 
times as likely to locate in villages with Gov-
ernment girls’ secondary schools—largely 
because students in these schools yesterday 
became the teachers in the private schools 
today.” Government secondary schools for 
girls have tremendous complementarity 
with breaking the teacher shortage con-
straint at the village level. The government 
can alleviate the teacher shortage constraint 
through a direct expansion of secondary 
schooling.
Credit Availability
 Existing private schools are growing 
rapidly - completely unsubsidised - at 
double-digit rates over two decades. All 
demographic trends point to continued 
expansion at this pace. Between 2000 and 
2005, a large majority of private schools 
started adding middle grades to their exist-
ing elementary enrollment as the current 
cohort of children moved up the education 
ladder. As requirements of teacher knowl-
edge and demand for facilities upgrades in-
creases, private schools will potentially have 
to go beyond their own pockets and those 
of friends and family to finance this expan-
sion. Creating new and innovative financing 
sources for the private sector should be an 
immediate priority. 
Support Systems
 While credit availability can help in 
alleviating some constraints, there are 
some inputs to education that might not be 
readily available “o!-the-shelf,” or where 
the existing school ownership might need 
technical help. Implementing curricular 
changes or new pedagogy might be 
provided through specific programs for the 
private sector.
While public schools are able to do this 
through existing centralised systems, quality 
can improve in private schools if they are 
o!ered support services (albeit with a 
charge) through facilitating mechanisms that 
can advise schools on management, syllabi, 
and technical training. This will give schools 
the flexibility to adapt their services to local 
circumstances in a more e!ective manner.
Public Schools
Improving Internal Governance
 By contrast, the public sector is rife with 
governance issues that are largely internal 
to the sector and many times internal to the 
school as well.
Local Control
 One of the reasons why private schools 
have been more successful than public 
schools is due to the ownership structure 
resulting in the “flex-approach”—based on 
the idea that the ability to make decisions 
should rest with those who are most 
qualified to make them. While planning and 
finance functions are carried out centrally 
in public schools, private schools are able 
to tailor the use of funds to the local needs, 
thereby negating the notion of “blueprint 
policy.” A crucial determinant of a (public) 
school’s success lies in its ability to be 
responsive to local demands and trends—
which can be dramatically di!erent for each 
school. 
Teacher Responsiveness
 In fact, one needs to go further and look 
at governance within a school structure. 
The teacher is the central figure in the 
system. Policy interventions that make the 
teacher responsive to the children’s needs 
and take e!ective interest in the classroom 
are of first order importance. Whether they 
are implemented through changing the 
incentive structure of salaries, through 
school councils or through bonus payments 
can only be decided after carefully designed 
experimentation. 
Recommendations on the Demand Side
School Choice 
Given the increase in school choices at the 
village level, vouchers that allow potentially 
credit-constrained parents to choose among 
both public and private schools can be an 
important step in facilitating the functioning 
of the market. These vouchers would 
highlight the e!ects of relaxing demand 
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constraints and of school responses to 
increased parental choice in improving their 
quality.
In order for this to be successful, however, 
voucher money needs to remain with 
the school, so that the school maintains 
full discretion in how the money can be 
spent. This has the dual benefit of ensuring 
local accountability and providing space 
for schools to experiment with ways to 
improve their quality. A true voucher does 
not discriminate between public and private 
schools and ensures payments to the school 
for every child attending. The regulatory 
framework governing public schools thus 
needs to be suitably amended to allow for 
this possibility. 
Inside the household
 LEAPS research shows that the learning 
environment within households is varied, 
e.g. in terms of child study time. This 
directly translates into di!ering learning 
outcomes for these kids. Creating programs 
that directly a!ect this environment, such 
as enabling mothers to better support child 
learning would pay large dividends. 
 In line with thinking of the linked nature 
of the educational marketplace, alleviating 
credit constraints through a voucher 
mechanism would also create more space 
within the household to allocate education 
resources. Interventions such as child-
centered schooling that engage parents in 
the classroom could also have potentially 
both in-school and household e!ects. 
Recommendations for the Market 
as a Whole
Information 
Availability of information on student 
and school performance is central to the 
development of an accountability system. 
Such information, when deemed credible, 
has an e!ect across the board on both 
households and the education providers.  
This information needs to be made available 
to parents, communities, and education 
providers in order to be most e!ective.
LEAPS experimental evidence has shown 
that using performance-based report cards 
at the village level leads to significant 
quality improvement of poorly performing 
private schools. Provision of information has 
led to increased competition among these 
schools, leading to a drop in prices in the 
higher performing schools.
The provision of performance report cards, 
especially when tied together with a voucher 
system and a mechanism for local school 
control for voucher funds in public schools, 
would allow for the  alignment of school and 
teacher incentives with parental demand.
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